Mutual recognition is one of the most appreciated innovations of the EU. The idea is that one can pursue market integration, indeed "deep' market integration, while respecting 'diversity' amongst the participating countries. Put differently, in pursuing 'free movement' for goods, mutual recognition facilitates free movement by disciplining the nature and scope of 'regulatory barriers', whilst allowing some degree of regulatory discretion for EU Member
Introduction and purpose
Mutual recognition is one of the most appreciated innovations of the EU. The idea is that one can pursue market integration, indeed "deep" market integration, while respecting 'diversity' amongst the participating countries. Put differently, in pursuing 'free movement' for goods in the EU internal market and hence going beyond merely removing tariffs and quotas, Mutual Recognition facilitates free movement by disciplining the nature and scope of 'regulatory barriers', whilst allowing some degree of regulatory discretion for the EU Member States. Compared to alternative options of 'deepening' market integration, this solution is attractive and, in principle, welfare increasing. Mutual recognition might also be appreciated because, in avoiding EU regulation, it tends to limit centralisation, while facilitating 'regulatory competition' between Member States and, possibly, lower the costs of the incredible regulatory heterogeneity business faces in the EU internal market.
Nevertheless, mutual recognition (= MR) is many things to many people.
1 2 The present contribution will not cast the net so wide. The focus will be on the successful and far-reaching examples of the EU internal market for goods and services.
The paper attempts to explain the (1) rationale and logic of mutual recognition in the EU internal goods market (section 2 ), (2) its working in actual practice in the EU for more than 25 years, culminating in a qualitative benefit / cost analysis (section 4) and (3) its recent improvement in terms of 'governance' in the so-called 2008 Goods package (section 5), thereby ameliorating the benefits / costs ratio. Lest it be forgotten, mutual recognition in the EU ought to be applied both to existing national regulation and new national regulation emerging from the Member States. For the latter, the EU has created an intrusive mechanism which has successfully protected the internal goods market from serious erosion over time (section 3). . Where possible and useful, this chapter will refer to notions sometimes seen, particularly by economists, as closely related to mutual recognition such as regulatory competition and 'better' 1 In the literature one finds that MR is a rule about conflicts of law between 2 or more countries, or a rule of choice concerning what country law applies, or, simply (functional) 'equivalence', or, a form of 'decentralized policing'. Authors distinguish 'pure', 'rootless' and 'managed' MR from (just) 'recognition', to mention only some examples. 2 MR can be very limited in scope, too, and this might not always be appreciated. Thus, WTO promotes mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) but all they do is to underpin MR solely for conformity assessment of a trading partner's technical requirements of a good (for purposes of im/export). The disappointment about making MRAs work effectively in world trade, despite their limited scope, can be better understood when understanding how the EU has solved quality requirements and mutual trust in this sensitive domain. However, this is a very demanding regime, perhaps too intrusive for many WTO partners. See e.g. section 5 and the references there.
regulation. The scant economic theory of MR is summarized in a Box in section 4. It will be shown that mutual recognition, rather than being inspired by academic theory, has emerged from the profound frustrations in EU circles about the first two decades of the internal market. Sections 6 and 7 attempt to extend the analysis to services. The former will show how the application of MR has spilled over from goods to services markets, culminating in the debate about a horizontal liberalisation directive (the Bolkestein draft of 2004) and the later services directive 2006/123. The meaning for the internal services market is not yet fully clear, as will be shown. Section 7 will briefly set out MR as applied in vertical (i.e. sectoral) services directives, with some examples. Section 8 concludes.
Rationale and logic of mutual recognition

The fundamental problem
The EU first established a customs union in the period 1958 -1968 . Internally, it implies 'free trade', the removal of all tariffs and quotas. Further deepening of goods market integration is required by the treaty because, unlike the WTO, the treaty incorporates the obligation to establish 'free movement'. Free movement implies the 'right' for EU economic agents to move goods (or, services, as the case might be) into any national market in the EU, that is, to have unhindered market access.
This concept is therefore much more radical than free trade as such. That right overrides the powers of EU Member States to put in place or maintain any access barrier, except if and insofar as the treaty specifies such instances or allows for certain derogations of free movement.
In more general economic parlance, free movement goes beyond free trade in that non-tariff barriers are forbidden or made irrelevant. Radical as that certainly is, free movement is not unlimited or unconditional. Simplifying, Member States may have two types of non-tariff barriers : those that cannot be justified by market failures or exceptions to the internal market (such as national security or public order) and those that can be justified. The design of the treaty, subsequent case law and secondary legislation (like Directives) should effectively eliminate the former, sooner or later. But what about the latter ? In traditional thinking, there are three ways of addressing 'justified' national interventions in their markets causing access barriers: national treatment, prohibitions and harmonisation. 3 Each one has drawbacks. If one wishes to protect the national regulatory autonomy (perhaps assuming that national regulation and other interventionism faithfully expresses the preferences of voters in a representative democratic system and these ought to be respected), the solution is to apply 'national treatment'. It means that EU Member States would allow "free" movement of goods (and services) if the providers comply with the rules of the destination (host) country. Discrimination is forbidden in this approach. This approach would imply, at best, a very truncated instance of 'free movement'. Economically, it would lead to major trading costs incurred before having market access, due to costs of adaptation ; indeed, the tariff equivalents of such costs may well imply a significant degree of factual protection from exposure to competitive imports from other EU countries. The EU internal market would largely remain fragmented except for goods (and services) which are not or only lightly regulated. Apart from non-discrimination in e.g. host country regulation, it differs little from (free) trade under the WTO. In other words, if one really wants 'deep' market integration, the national regulatory autonomy will have to be compromised to some degree.
In traditional thinking, there are two ways of compromising national regulatory autonomy for the purpose of 'free movement' : prohibitions and 'harmonisation'. When prohibiting all regulatory or other non-tariff barriers in the EU, even when 'justified' by (say) market failures, welfare is bound to fall. The whole point of subjecting markets to regulation in the event of market failures is to prevent sub-optimal functioning of markets. The costs of not overcoming market failures vary enormously, dependent on the issue and the kind of market failure, so it is hard to generalize.
However, the very purpose 4 of the EU and a properly functioning internal market as its principal means is to stimulate higher productivity increases and more economic growth, which is inconsistent with an approach of all-out prohibitions lowering welfare over a broad spectrum of applications.
Indeed, an internal market with plenty of market failures is pointless.
This leaves a third way: harmonisation. The origin of the term reflects a sophisticated response to the fundamental problem of 'deep' market integration. The term used to refer to the idea that national regulation of the Member States would need to be 'brought into harmony' in such a way that 'free movement' could be accomplished without all the costs of adaptation, etc. The English treaty term 'approximation' similarly expresses this idea. However, in the early history of the EU, harmonisation degenerated into full uniformity due to mistrust (or bargaining tactics, under veto threat) of Member States and the initial refusal to accept the full consequences of 'deep ' market integration, including some degree of regulatory adaptation. Harmonisation became excessively detailed and 'heavy', causing high costs of (EU) regulation, and without any cost/ benefit analysis.
Nowadays, there is a far greater awareness of the need to make 'proportionate' (EU) regulation, e.g. no more than necessary for the market failure.
Today, the European Commission is held to subject every proposal to strict Regulatory Impact Assessment. 5 The lesson of four decades of (EU) harmonisation is that one has to find a suitable balance between, on the one hand, not suppressing the preferences of the (or some) Member States too much (as this may be welfare decreasing), and, on the other hand, avoiding overly costly common regulation by incorporating each and every specific element of national (often diverse) rules, prompting 'regulatory failure'.
The treaty incorporates all three options (see below section 2.2.). There is a general prohibition of what one might call regulatory barriers, but with derogations, as well as a broad harmonisation provision. National treatment might apply as well, once derogations of free movements can be invoked, and if these derogations are not disciplined in other ways by case-law. However, usually, one should expect that derogations will prompt proposals for harmonisation of some kind. Certainly in goods, few areas are left over where derogations have remained without eventually having resulted in harmonisation (or at least attempts to do so). In other words, national treatment is no longer of much significance when speaking about free movement. But it ought to be noted that, in services, the mode of 'establishment' is far more important than free movement (due to the need to satisfy clients' preferences of proximity of providers and of building relations of trust). In establishment, national treatment (host country rules) make more sense and normally cause fragmentation less easily. Thus, such national treatment is typically disciplined by general regulatory principles under the treaty ( including non-discrimination in a wide sense) and sometimes by basic common rules, leaving scope for local variation and discretion.
After some 20 years of building the EU internal (goods) market, the balance between the three options and the results for free movement looked anything but promising. To put it simple, a huge number of regulatory barriers were still place because the general prohibition was undermined by countless derogations, invoked by member States almost without discipline, whilst harmonisation proved costly and very slow (also due to vetoes). It is against this background that MR as an innovation has to be understood. First, the CJEU interpretation of the prohibition was significantly tightened from a narrow legalistic to a more economic interpretation of what a (regulatory) barrier was. This meant that the burden of proof for Member States of what is a justified barrier, was made more difficult -it had simply been too easy before.
Second, the CJEU imposed a duty on Member States to 'think internal market', so to say, and not solely national. The criterium became 'equivalence'. Even if derogations were justified by overcoming market failures, this would not automatically mean that imports could be blocked. As it turned out, numerous instances appeared to exist where other Member States acted very similarly in response to the same market failures. If such national responses were 'equivalent' in terms of avoiding the market failure(s), neither harmonisation nor the refusal of market access would be justified. Free movement ought to be allowed, even if the details of national laws were distinct, as long as their objectives of e.g. protecting consumer or workers were "equivalent". A fourth option had been born, Mutual Recognition, not undermining national regulatory autonomy, nor leading to harmonisation, yet 'deepening' market integration.
Case-law on the fundamental trilemma and Mutual Recognition
This section will discuss the same fundamental problem in the context of the treaty as well as CJEU case law, explaining in greater detail the logic of MR.
As noted , the three options (before MR emerged) can be found in the treaty. As to the third optionharmonisation -Art. 114, TFEU (Art. 95, EC) forms the legal basis for 'approximation' for purposes of "… the establishment and functioning of the internal market". Figure 1 visualizes the 'trilemma' of the EU in effectively realizing and guaranteeing 'free movement of goods'.
Figure 1: EEC's free-movement-of-goods trilemma
Mutual recognition has emerged from the tensions, problems and profound dissatisfaction in combinating these three fundamental treaty provisions. Putting it simple, the Union was caught into a seemingly impossible trilemma: Art. 34 could not be relied on in a blanket form as this would erase the capacity of Member States to regulate, if only for correcting or overcoming market failures. Art.
36 could not be relied on too much either since this would make a mockery of the common market idea, with more holes than a good Emmenthaler cheese; but Art. 114 was not a panacea either as it would imply building a vast EU regulatory regime over many decades, amounting to a drastic defacto centralisation, with all the costs that this would entail. Moreover, the decision-making (in the Council in the 1970s) ex Art. 114 was still under veto and the mistrust amongst Member States as well as vis-à-vis the Commission was such that EU rules were only acceptable to all if no discretion for escape or disguised protectionism would remain (the so-called Old Approach, going into extreme detail and with full technical specifications). So, when harmonisation was decided under unanimity, it was bound to generate excessive regulatory costs and -due to veto tactics and resistance to specific aspects which were left out for political reasons -relatively minor (net) benefits, while requiring disproportionate efforts by EU bodies, and fuelling considerable discord. Risking regulatory failure with net benefits so small ( or even negative) and going at snail's pace, this approach to harmonisation would never accomplish the internal goods market. This is 'judicial mutual recognition' (left bottom boxes in Figure 2 ).
If not equivalent, the derogations do apply and the only way to restore free movement is 'approximation'. However, even here MR can (and did) lead to a highly significant simplification.
Thus, the New Approach is based on directives where the joint definition of regulatory (SHEC) objectives is what matters in the text. Once objectives are commonly defined, the lack of equivalence is by definition removed and can no longer be a reason to hinder intra-EU imports. The
Old Approach (mainly developed before Cassis de Dijon), by contrast, harmonizes by attempting to unify almost all technical aspects of (SHEC) regulation, including extremely detailed technical specifications, testing, approvals, inspection and certification. This is unnecessarily costly and rigid. It is also exceedingly difficult to accomplish in Council decision-making and far more difficult still in a Council where Member States were insisting on veto power. The quality of this overly specific and detailed regulation suffered for the simple reason that 'bad regulation' with superfluous or excessively costly requirements would be forced into EU law via the use of veto power. The Old Approach also violates any respect for diversity, even where it would have been possible.
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9 Note that this test can be regarded as an early manifestation of a shift from form-based legalistic justifications to effects-based economic approaches, as is now customary in e.g. EU competition law. 10 The notion of SHEC is a simplification but it catches the large bulk of regulatory issues related to MR. It is also relevant in services, be it that investor/ saver protection should be added as a special case (see section 7). In Art. 36, TFEU the key references are to health and safety and possibly elements of environmental policy. The rule-of-reason case law ex. Art. 34, TFEU explicitly underpins environmental and consumer protection. All other justifications are either of trivial importance (e.g. arts trade) or relate to IPRs. For legal analysis, see Barnard, 2007, chapters 6, 7 and 19 and Weiler, 2005. 11 For details, see Atkins (1997) . See Pelkmans (1987) Approach, all stakeholders immediately realized that the specifics -no longer incorporated in law as in the Old Approach -had to be known for producers in other ways, before actual production would take place.
Thus, in the New Approach, the common objectives in light directives are complemented by 'reference to standards'. A carefully structured regime of 'co-regulation' has been set up which develops (voluntary) European technical standards on the basis of 'mandates' issued by the European Commission, in turn derived from the SHEC objectives in the relevant directive(s). Market participants, and not Eurocrats or national civil servants, develop standards for the EU. The
Commission recognizes these standards (if a correct follow-up of the mandate, hence, serving SHEC objectives for the EU) and, after official publication, business can rely on them for intra-EU free movement. 13 This regime is much appreciated because it provides business with guidelines and certainty. European standards incorporated in a regulatory MR regime are also attractive because they do remain voluntary. In case a company is innovative and creates novel aspects or techniques or uses new materials not foreseen in a European standard, the new good can be tested directly (and certified) on the compliance with the SHEC objectives in the relevant directive(s).
Unlike the Old Approach, innovation is not throttled for two reasons: (i) performance standards are expected and they provide a lot of room for product differentiation and innovation 14 and (ii) a company is, even with the flexible performance standard, still free to construct 'around' the standard (though it needs to acquire certification from a so-called Notified Body, assigned to fulfil these tasks).
In short, as Figure 2 sets out, 'judicial mutual recognition' amounts to the origin principle in its pure formulation, together with equivalence of existing regulatory objectives of Member States, whereas its main alternative, 'regulatory MR', consists of the common regulation of SHEC objectives, together with mutual recognition of all the specific technical requirements in national laws facilitated by recognized European performance standards. In both approaches, the quite sensational result is that existing technical details in national laws, supposedly to be enforced by the responsible inspectors or civil servants, cannot be used to block intra-EU imports, except if that good does not comply with recognized European standards or clearly violates SHEC objectives themselves.
A digression on how MR case law works
In stylizing the MR case law with Figure 2 , the logic of focussing on equivalent objectives stands out.
The objectives reflect the market failures to be overcome, providing justified reasons to regulate in the first place. In an economic perspective, this is what matters. However, European lawyers would probably find such a presentation of the CJEU case law wanting. Although there can be no doubt that the CJEU has emphasized time and again that Member States ought to think and act in terms of equivalence in a number of ways, there are also numerous CJEU cases about restrictions of the free movement of goods where equivalence considerations are absent. Does that imply that MR is not relevant i.e. Figure 2 would not apply? The answer is that restrictions may be declared illegal under EU law for many other reasons, which, in standard case law proceedings, tend to be verified before 13 This is legally referred to as the "presumption of compliance". For European business, this is cost saving in terms of information and incentivising in terms of legal certainty. Companies, when making technical products, will have few difficulties in following European performance standards in their in-factory manuals. If done faithfully, the goods will then enjoy intra-EU market access, without the need to master complex EU case law. 14 Indeed, the use of (prescriptive, hence, restrictive) design standards has to be justified. The result is that they have become exceedingly rare nowadays.
arriving at an equivalence test. See Figure 3 . If a Member State claims that its restrictions of free movement are 'justified' (see the upper left box) by derogations, routine case law will first test these derogations against a number of core principles and conditions of EU law, arising from the treaty or case law itself (see central box). The most prominent one is non-discrimination on grounds of nationality (Art. 18, TFEU) on the basis of which the CJEU has developed strict and extensive case law ever since the outset of the EU. Member States have learnt, by now, to avoid discrimination in goods markets but this has taken decades and remains less than perfect. If a restriction is caught as discriminatory, it is illegal and no equivalence test is needed.
The second condition is spelled out in modern regulatory parlance: proper risk assessment (i.e.
science based by independent experts and in tune with internationally expected rigour in analysis).
The idea is that, since SHEC is risk regulation, the risk(s) have to be underpinned by state-of-the-art scientific analysis, as the basis for risk-reducing national regulation, in order to be evaluated by the CJEU. In cases of 'disguised' protectionism, this test is an effective way to reveal that restrictions of free movement based on national regulation do not offer consumers or workers any (greater) protection in terms of SHEC. Initially, systematic risk assessment was not practiced in Europe (except in e.g. pharmaceuticals) and ad-hoc testimonies by scientists in court would accomplish analogue results.
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Third, the 'necessity' test aims to verify that regulatory interventions by the EU country are 'necessary' given the risk reduction preferences. The CJEU tends to assume a strict position. It might also verify whether the measures are actually suitable to bring down the risks to the desired level.
Finally, and decisive in numerous cases, the CJEU applies a "proportionality" test in an ever stricter fashion over time. Narrowly conceived, proportionality is equated with "no more than necessary" on order to achieve the regulatory objective. In many cases the CJEU could avoid having to render a judgment on national objectives (expressing national preferences) by focussing solely on the relation between instruments and objective(s). In particular, the restrictive effect on free movement (hence, the costs inflicted on actual or potential competitors from other Member States) can often be avoided or reduced by other regulatory options. More widely conceived, the CJEU has insisted that Member States take into account the internal market context of their measures, that is, imposing a duty on (a) Member State(s) to cooperate in pre-empting regulatory barriers.
Figure 3: Mutual Recognition CJEU analysis in goods
This is a critical step towards MR. Altogether, these four tests (in the central box of Figure 3 ) can be said to amount to "good regulation principles in an internal market context". Adhering to those principles already reduces the restrictions to free movement of goods a great deal. In other words, besides the national economic benefits of 'good regulation', the static and dynamic benefits of actual and potential cross-border competition in the internal goods market can be enjoyed as well.
Following these tests one can shift to the third box in Figure 3 : the question of 'equivalence'. In principle, this is about equivalence of objectives but, in actual practice, it usually takes the form of practical verification of instruments reflecting these objectives. Derogations subject to "good regulation" tests in IM: 
Preventing new regulatory barriers from arising
MR, whether judicial or regulatory, pays attention to the stock of regulatory barriers in the internal goods market. But focussing on the stock is rather narrow-minded. Perhaps it is too little realized but
Member States have grown into genuine 'regulatory machines'. The painstaking case law based on MR and the enormous European standardisation work linked to the New Approach -no matter how helpful -completely ignore that Member States tend to create a steady flow of new regulatory barriers year after year. In the days of unanimity, given a very low speed of harmonisation removing barriers, the Commission began to fear that the fragmentation of the internal goods market was increasing, not decreasing. Even before the EU would succeed in its rethink of the method of harmonisation (the New Approach), a mechanism was set up to ensure that the flow of new national regulation would be subjected by a kind of MR, and, in so doing, not add new restrictions of free movement. It is possible to show convincingly that the internal goods market would long have been hopelessly constricted, if the EU would not have introduced an amazingly tough control and correction system for new national legislation in process.
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This system is based on ideas underlying MR, topped up by an intrusive and stringent notification system (with tough sanctions in case of non-notification, emerging from firm rulings by the CJEU), close monitoring by the Commission of failures to notify, detailed scrutiny of draft laws of Member
States by a special Committee chaired by the Commission, and -most remarkable of all -automatic or semi-automatic suspension of the national legislative process for periods varying from 3 months to as much as 18 months, dependent on the need for remedies and their nature. This contribution is not the place to discuss all the features of the regime 17 but it is difficult to overestimate its merits.
What matters for present purposes is how central MR is to the remedies sought. (Pelkmans, Vos & di Mauro, 2000) . If the enacted laws, later, do not have such clauses, they infringe EU law, and are unenforceable against intra-EU imports. The conclusion is that the regime, backed up by significant resources and efforts as well as by strict CJEU rulings, forms a powerful and credible agent for mutual recognition to be maintained and to become more 'visible'
for business over time.
The numbers are impressive. Between 1988 and 1998 the total number of national notifications was about 5000 and the trend was upward (Pelkmans, Vos & di Mauro., 2000, p. 274) . In the period 1999 to 2005, the annual rate was close to 600 a year and moved up once the new Member States came in (Pelkmans, 2007a, p. 707 
Benefits and costs of EU mutual recognition until 2008
It is insightful to subject MR in goods to a benefit/cost analysis. This is done in Table 1 Furthermore, regulatory MR disciplines overregulation at both levels of government, since the focus is on objectives and the reliance on European performance standards reduces considerably the scope for idiosyncratic (or, protectionist?) specifics. Regulatory MR does add EU rules but minimally so, and drastically less than the Old Approach would do.
The third benefit concerns economic welfare which is what the internal market is all about: MR is pro-competitive, if not strongly pro-competitive at times compared to its alternatives, be it that strategic quality games cannot be excluded (given that equivalence of objectives is to be satisfied).
Box 1 elaborates on the scarce economic analysis available in the literature. With this litany of advantages, MR seems almost too-good-to-be-true. Indeed, this is how, naively, MR is often portrayed among economists. Unfortunately, there is an inclination to neglect the considerable drawbacks of MR in actual practice, both for business and authorities, whether EU or national. It is important to appreciate the costs of MR for business and authorities. have no idea about MR or that it might matter to them, let alone that companies would know how to verify whether it is applied to their goods. One costly consequence of this ignorance is that many SMEs fail to consider MR and thus either refrain from exporting to countries, or, do export but after costly adaptations, which is exactly what MR aims to avoid. For companies which do know about MR, the costs of verifying whether MR would apply to their goods can be high and/or lead to uncertainty.
health or safety. Thus, whilst Germany can maintain its beer purity law for domestic producers, that law cannot be a reason to stop the import of beer from other Member States. It does not follow, however, that beer brewers located in Germany are immediately and powerfully exposed to price competitive imports of 'other' EU beer. Beer distribution in German pubs is entirely in the hands of local breweries and, more often than not, Germans stick to beer made according to the purity law. What one observes is some marginal penetration in supermarkets (bottles/cans) and patrol stations along highways and its procompetitive impact is probably modest. Therefore, regulatory competition should be subjected to a careful industrial economic analysis before jumping to conclusions about the removal of local (over?) regulation prompted by local industry 'suffering' from local rules stricter than rules in other Member States. Stronger, the larger German breweries do not have to apply the purity law to exports (which for some of them is their lifeline of business) and therefore remain competitive in the internal market. There are scattered attempts to develop economic theory but it is disjointed and no 'body' of economic analysis is available yet. One 'strand' which has received some attention is based on the cost-increasing effect of regulatory barriers rendering market entry more difficult. Abraham (1991) shows graphically and for homogeneous goods that, dependent on the costs of adjustment to enter national markets inside the internal goods market, that the latter may well remain effectively fragmented, with permanent price disparities. The Old Approach, with vetoes, is likely to prompt calls for a level-playing field, which is bound to push up the overall EU level of regulation and thereby "raising rivals' costs", in turn significantly reducing the competitive threat for the least competitive country. Mutual recognition would thus be clearly pro-competitive. Falvey (1989) and Abraham (1991) In addition, there are costs because of 'grey areas' about when 'equivalence' applies, both for business and the authorities, even when national authorities do act in a spirit of MR. Unfortunately, the lack of a 'rule book' for MR, in particular for national inspecting agencies or other officials, causes most civil servants not to act in that spirit; rather, they often attempt to enforce local rules. The Commission has gradually come to realize the downside of judicial MR and issued reports and soft guidelines, it has also greatly improved the information on its (TRIS) website 25 , promoted seminars and launched a special campaign for the new Member States. Vis a vis business this is unlikely to help much because many SMEs tend to ignore such general campaigns. For officials the utility is greater. Furthermore, business is often hesitant to ensure their rights under Community law. One reason is that future business in the destination country ought not to be jeopardized. Besides, the pursuit of one's rights under Community law is very slow and costly. Business often rightly notes that legal progress about free movement should not be conquered by them but reasonably guaranteed by the system. 27 It is striking that these costs are arising, in part, from the absence of networking between 25 The TRIS website provides information on the removal or prevention of regulatory (mainly technical) barriers to free movement. Third, compliance costs typically exist when judicial MR fails; under regulatory MR they are exceptional. However, there is no reliable evidence on compliance costs.
Until 2008, MR in the EU goods market was therefore characterized by multiple and substantial benefits and a number of costs which, for business, tended to accumulate to often deterrent levels.
There are also costs for national authorities when they enforce rules in the spirit of MR. The disturbing conclusion, at least for judicial MR, is that the very companies relying on MR in the internal market are hardly 'protected' by its regime. The incentives were in some ways perverse and they will have to be altered into positive ones for judicial MR to engender the much wanted benefits for the Union. The picture for regulatory MR is far brighter. Moreover, the rules impose transparancy and facilitate appeal. For all these reasons, the regulation is a genuine relief for business, in particular SMEs. Figure 4 summarizes the key provisions. The information obligations for Member States have to be organized structurally via so-called "contact points", behind which a system has to be set up making it possible to access and provide highly specialized technical information (what laws and decrees? what (national or European ) standards ; what institutions involved ?). Such information has to be given for free (as a right) and within two weeks. The back-up system has to dispose of sufficient means in order to be capable of delivery throughout the year. The 27 contact points are expected to be in touch with one another routinely (a new electronic system might be set up for that purpose) so as to make MR work much better and without much ado. This should be an effective underpinning of mutual trust, indispensable for smooth MR. A further 'service' to European business is the Commission announcement of a list of goods falling under MR, in eurospeak the "non-harmonized sector".
Restoring mutual recognition incentives under proper EU governance
Meanwhile, a first version of such a list has become available but it is not improbable that improved and refined lists will follow in the future since the identification of exactly what does and does not fall under MR is not always easy. forced to alter their administrative conduct at all levels and firms will be able to enforce their rights under much greater legal certainty and with lower costs, if any.
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It is important to underline that nothing in these procedures affects the SHEC objectives of national regulations. If there is a genuine issue of non-conformity, the Member State has every right to take the good from the market and the Commission will normally support that.
32 This only goes to show that, in some cases, European business was, and to some extent still is at times, uncertain about the relevance of MR to their products. It would seem that the MR regulation has rightly been applauded as the appropriate 'governance' to make MR work as intended and thereby deepening the internal market for goods, whilst improving its effective functioning.
Mutual recognition in services : horizontal liberalisation
Negative and positive market integration in services has always fallen behind the deepening of the internal market in goods ; it has also been less wide in scope and less firm. It is only in the last two decades that the CJEU and, more hesitantly, the EU legislator have begun to address the barriers in earnest. In the context of the present contribution, the focus will merely be on aspects relevant to MR, thereby inevitably leaving out many other interesting elements needed for a fuller appreciation of the gradual emergence of a functioning internal services market. The present section will discuss what is called "horizontal services liberalisation": the achievement of free movement and the effective exercise of the right of establishment in sectors which are regulated only relatively lightly.
The term suggests that the EU legislator (Council & EP) would not need to regulate or perhaps only with 'minimum harmonisation'. The CJEU should be able to ensure these economic freedoms, possibly with MR as well. Section 7 will briefly discuss MR in (vertically) regulated services such as financial services, transport and professional services.
CJEU case law in services is complicated and, at times, confusing. 35 The following cannot be but a stylized presentation of its logic. The CJEU has gradually tightened its rulings with the effect of disciplining more effectively national services regulation in the internal market. It is useful to keep Figure 3 (on goods) in mind because the analogy with services is close. If we ignore the objective of investor and saver protection -which falls under vertical regulation of financial markets anyway,
hence not under horizontal liberalisation -the objectives Member States pursue in national services regulation amount to SHEC. But this is not nearly as clearcut as it is in goods, and case law also goes beyond SHEC. In the treaty section on services, there is no article comparable to Art. 36, TFEU (identifying specific derogations) ; in the treaty section on establishment, Art. 52, TFEU only specifies derogations on the general grounds of "..public policy, public security or public health". Provisions on the economic freedoms are similar to that in goods (i.e, Art. 34, TFEU), without employing the convoluted wording "measures with an equivalent effect to .. quantitative restrictions". Art. 56, TFEU
states that ".. restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited..". It is the same in Art. 49, TFEU : "… restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member
State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited". Establishment is also subject to 'national treatment' (Art.s 49, 54 and 55, TFEU). If derogations to the free movement of services are applied, non-discrimination is compulsory (Art. 61, TFEU). Note that all these provisons have never been revised since 1957.
In case law on services, the lack of detail in the treaty has had two crucial consequences, apart from an initial hesitation on the part of economic agents to challenge restrictions imposed by Member
States. First, hindering or blocking free movement of services or establishment was initially assessed by the CJEU with a view to direct or indirect discrimination.
One might say that national services regulation was gradually 'cleansed' from discriminatory provisions, a much needed but nonetheless modest achievement. 36 Second, with almost no specifications on possible derogations, a body of 'rule of reason' justifications was built up, regarded as "imperative reasons relating to the public interest" or, much the same, "imperative requirements in the general interest". 37 Over time, the list has become quite long and the wording is often rather general. 38 One may indeed argue on the grounds of legal certainty or for the deepening of the internal services market that the treaty ought to be revised yielding more specific guidance, and/or secondary EU law be enacted (in other words, a more active and agile EU legislator, creating legitimacy for the rules and unburdening the CJEU from such creative constructions). Sooner or later, a more sweeping approach was bound to emerge since early case law kept numerous barriers in place. In order to understand the essence of the greater determination since the beginning of the 1990s, two modes of disciplining national regulation are important : disciplining 'restrictions' and the 36 Note that, in exceptional instances, and based on a strict CJEU interpretation, discriminatory provisions may be justified for 'public policy, public security or public health' under Art. 52, TFEU. 37 The first formulation can be found in e.g. Case C-58/98 Corsten [2000] ECR I-0000 para 35 ; the second in e.g. Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165 para 39. 38 Known as the 'general good' approach framed in very broad objectives, and subsequently assessed strictly, it includes e.g. intellectual property, consumer protection, protection of workers, conservation of national heritage, sound administration of justice, cohesion of the tax system, requirements of road safety, the financial balance of the social security system and language requirements (for dentists, in the interest of patients). The reader will observe that many of these are inspired by the approach in goods.
'country-of-origin-principle'. The first one became more prominent since the Saeger ruling (1991) and also plays a role in the services directive 2006/123, whereas the second one is employed in the ecommerce directive, the TV-without-frontiers directive and the Bolkestein draft directive.
The Saeger ruling 39 sharpens CJEU case law by employing language reminiscent of Dasssonville : "… Art. *now 56, TFEU + ..requires…the abolition of any *non-discriminatory+ restriction … liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services". Wording like "less advantageous" or "more difficult" has also been used. Observe that this ruling disciplines restrictions but does not go as far as
Cassis-de-Dijon where the origin principle is first pronounced. Nevertheless, the difference is slim because 'otherwise impede' or 'more difficult' casts the net very wide indeed. Both in Cassis-deDijon (see Figure 2 ) and in Saeger, it is really the justified derogations which matter, but the set of derogations in services seems larger. Subsequent case law (and to some extent, already before) strictly analyzes the application of derogations, in analogy with the central box in In a third step (in analogy with Figure 3 , right-bottom box), the CJEU tests for a simple form of MR via explicit proofs such as (identical) tests on standards, licensing and its conditions or approvals in the EU country of establishment of the provider. Rather than MR of precise 'objectives', the CJEU refers to the 'public interest' as pursued in the country of origin. Thus, the treaty freedom to provide services "may be restricted only by rules justified by the public interest… in so far as that interest is not safeguarded by the rules to which the provider of such a service is subject in the Member State where he is established". 43 In the Mediawet case 44 the Court held that restrictions of the freedom to provide services are prohibited "… if the requirements embodied in that legislation are already satisfied by the rules imposed on those persons in the Member State in which they are established". decades. The main effect of the gradual sharpening and widening of this MR test during the 1990s
and later was to stimulate economic agents to reveal (by going to court) the many restrictions they were subjected to. The increasing awareness of a thick and very wide web of restrictions in the internal services market eventually led to the 2002 Commission report 47 on those barriers, as a stepping stone for the draft Bolkestein directive.
48
The underlying conviction of the Bolkestein draft was that case law would not suffice to establish a well-functioning internal market for services and that the EU legislator had to act firmly. The provider is established. Called 'mutual assistance', it goes some way towards MR. This is going to be supported by the (electronic) Internal Market Information system (for the national officials), which has meanwhile begun to operate for a number of internal market purposes. What is lacking in these two articles is the emphasis on the duty of the country where the service is provided, to verify details in the origin country and finding them wanting, with a formal reasoned decision and appeal options, before imposing restrictions in the first place. That obligation would render it similar to the measures in Figure 4 ensuring MR for goods.
Mutual recognition in EU sectoral services regulation
The present section will remain brief on the application of MR in sectoral EU services regulation. In financial markets, transport and professional services, MR has assumed meanings and forms somewhat distinct from horizontal MR. Financial market liberalisation and EU regulation (as well as supervision) has gone through four stages. The first stage only concerned the right of establishment, took place during the 1970s and hardly induced cross-border intra-EU financial market liberalisation.
During the EC1992 process, the free movement of services was tackled in a novel way. With exchange restrictions removed by 1988, the financial markets regime built by 1992 consisted mainly of directives ensuring 'sound' financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies and investment houses (merchant banks), based on solvency requirements, capital requirements, avoiding large exposures to single companies (or countries), etc. Market players' trust (including consumers) in the soundness of such institutions is critical : they themselves cannot verify that and this asymmetry of information is so important that it can be paralyzing for the internal financial markets. Once such institutions are very big, contagion might also occur and in that event financial stability might be impaired. Hence, for micro and macro economic reasons, the EU had to arrange common minimum rules on supervision, too. The novel aspect was the move from host to home country control (of the supervision of banks,etc.). It works as follows: the home country of a bank (where the headquarters is established) is obliged to supervise, following the EU rules, and cooperate in a joint EU Committee of national supervisors ; in order to establish and maintain mutual trust, information (on those banks, etc.) will flow freely and fully in the Committee whenever needed.
Based on these provisions, the bank receives a kind of 'EU passport' to do business anywhere in the EU, and if that is done with subsidiaries, the supervision of the home country is "mutually recognized" by the host country of the subsidiary.
During the second stage, the services as such in the four financial markets ( banking, insurance, investment services and asset management) were usually not EU regulated, with the exception of consumer credit and mutual funds. In transport services, regulation is more limited, that is, mainly safety rules for transport equipment, environmental rules and minimum qualifications of firms and persons providing services (as well as strict rules for working hours while flying, riding or driving). Again, licensing and supervision of safety and environment is national (although the latter can of course be randomly inspected by other Member States) and mutually recognized. In this sector, the MR system seems to work well. This is a major achievement. The treaty calls for a common transport policy but this has anything but the characteristics of a heavy, imposing set of rules and prescriptions. 58 Quite the contrary, focussing on essential regulation only and combined with MR of home-country-control, a relatively smooth and highly competitive single transport market has emerged. Only rail freight is moving only slowly.
In professional services, the rules are national. More often than not, these rules are a mix of public regulation and private codes of conduct, with internal sanctioning regimes for purposes of reputation and consumer trust. Because of this mix, it is exceedingly hard to unravel the possibly anticompetitive elements from the ones justified by market failures. This is rendered even more difficult due to the nature of these services consisting of 'experience' goods (but not always with repeat purchasing) or 'credence goods' with strong asymmetries of information. Following the powerful Europeanisation of business, professional services are much more active across borders than one or two decades ago and therefore less resistant to a gradual Europeanisation of codes of conduct. Still, codes as well as national regulation frequently maintain idiosyncratic characteristics which tend to segment the internal market and render cross-border services expensive or impossible. The sector has long attempted to apply MR to its diploma's. Art. 53, TFEU employs the term 'mutual recognition' for this purpose ever since the Rome treaty. At first, this MR lacked any credibility, due to a lack of trust, a lack of willingness on the part of providers ( presumably, a protection of 'their' markets) and a lack of demand from European business. What was practiced, boiled down to "maximum harmonisation" in endless negotiations, resulting in a throttling of free movement or establishment. 
Conclusions
Mutual recognition is a great invention of the EU. However, before it works beyond some obvious instances of disguised protectionism, 62 MR requires considerable refinement. The EU has gradually 61 See e.g. Philipsen, 2009 for an overview of the economics of accounting regulation in OECD countries, with much attention to the EU case. See also Delimatsis, op. cit. 62 Remember the typical cases of Cassis de Dijon, Italian pasta of durum wheat, a Dutch refusal to import certain types of German bread or the French prohibition of aspartam in light-cola, etc. 63 One phrase used being that MR is "a phantom in the court room."
The new governance of judicial MR drastically reduces these costs and gives far-reaching legal certainty, inter alia via a reversal of the burden of proof for non-conformity of goods already allowed on the market in other Member States. Together with the high quality, yet competitive system of certification over the entire EU, and the expected consolidation of the Notified Bodies, market access in goods regulated only at the national level will significantly further improve and this should incentivize in particular SMEs keen (but deterred in the past) to operate in a range of countries in the single market.
In services, MR has assumed different forms. Therefore, it is hazardous to generalize. As far as horizontal services liberalisation is concerned, case law on the freedom to provide services in the internal market has long remained shallow. Over time, a stepwise logic comparable with (horizontal) goods liberalisation as in Figure 3 Finally, some attention is paid to MR in sectoral services regulation. In financial services and in transport, not the services tend to be regulated but the firms or market institutions providing services. It is the supervision of these provisions which is mutually recognized (home country control and an EU passport for establishment). The high degree of mutual trust of this approach necessitates tight cooperation, if not some centralisation, of the organisation. In transport, this seems to work, with less centralisation in road haulage and more in air transport or rail. In financial services, several stages in building EU financial markets have not prevented the financial crisis. It has revealed that further tightened and tougher rules with respect to risk management are badly needed. Also, better common supervision is a conditio-sine-qua-non for MR to be applied in a credible fashion. For professional services, the relevance of MR relates to diploma's. After fake attempts to apply MR (realizing 'maximum harmonisation' in endless negotiations, without much hope of any economic impact for cross-border services), a more MR-driven approach has been built up since 1989, culminating an overarching 2005 directive. However, to make this work effectively remains exceedingly hard. It might well be indispensable that EU-wide codes-of-conduct (also encouraged in the 2006 services directive) and further harmonisation be accomplished, possibly aided by EU competition policy, before genuine MR in this domain works.
